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Abstract
The Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) is a single-axis pointing mechanism used to orient the solar power
generating arrays relative to the sun for the International Space Station (ISS). Approximately 83 days
after its on-orbit installation, one of the two SARJ mechanisms aboard the ISS began to exhibit high drive
motor current draw. Increased structural vibrations near the joint were also observed. Subsequent
inspections via Extravehicular Activity (EVA) discovered that the nitrided case hardened steel bearing
race on the outboard side of the joint had extensive damage to one of its three rolling surfaces. A far-
reaching investigation of the anomaly was undertaken. The investigation included metallurgical
inspections, coupon tests, traction kinematics tests, detailed bearing measurements, and thermal and
structural analyses. The results of the investigation showed that anomaly had most probably been caused
by high bearing edge stresses that resulted from inadequate lubrication of the rolling contact. The profile
of the roller bearings and the metallurgical properties of the race ring were also found to be significant
contributing factors. To mitigate the impact of the damage astronauts cleaned and lubricated the race ring
surface with grease. This corrective action led to significantly improved performance of the mechanism
both in terms of drive motor current and induced structural vibration.
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Introduction
International Space Station Overview
The International Space Station (ISS) is a research facility currently being assembled in low Earth orbit.
The ISS project is a multi-national effort led by the United States, with partners from Russia, Canada, the
European Union, Japan, and others. Construction of the ISS began in 1998 and is scheduled to be
complete by 2011 with operations continuing until 2015. The ISS is the largest artificial satellite in Earth
orbit, larger than any previous space station. It was designed as an orbital scientific platform and is
intended to operate continuously while supporting a crew of six in pressurized modules. The ISS offers an
advantage over spacecraft such as NASA's Space Shuttle because it is a long-term platform in the space
environment, allowing scientific experimentation as well as long-duration studies on the human crews that
operate them. Long-term expedition crews conduct science daily (approximately 160 man-hours per
week), across a wide variety of fields, including human research, life sciences, physical sciences, and
Earth observation, as well as education and technology demonstrations. The power required to support
the scientific and life sustaining functions of the ISS is provided by arrays of solar panels.
The ISS has a backbone or set of trusses that house several ISS systems. These trusses are joined to a
set of pressurized modules that house the crewmembers living and working aboard the ISS. Figure 1
below shows the ISS after assembly mission 17A by the Space Shuttle. The pressurized modules are
located along the center of the truss structure, extending forward and aft. The power generating solar
arrays are located on the port and starboard sides of the truss structure outboard of the SARJs. The
location of each Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) is indicated in the Figure.
Figure 1. International Space Station as of August 2009
Solar Alpha Rotary Joint Overview
The SARJ is a single-axis pointing mechanism that allows orbital-rate sun-tracking rotation of the
outboard trusses and solar arrays of the ISS. The SARJ completes one full rotation per orbit of the ISS,
approximately every 90 minuets. Figure 2 shows a drawing of
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made of a 15-5PH stainless steel forging with a nitride hardened case. TBAs are designed for individual
on-orbit replacement to protect the mechanism against a roller bearing failure. The SARJ is driven by one
of two redundant Drive Lock Assemblies (DLAs) that interface with an integral bull gear on the race ring
via a motor-driven pinion. Each DLA is controlled by a Rotary Joint Motor Controller (RJMC) which, in
conjunction with processors in the ISS computing infrastructure, performs closed loop control of the joint’s
motion. SARJ system health and status data is relayed by the processors to the ground in the ISS
telemetry stream.
Trundle Bearing Assembly Overview
The TBA contains three roller bearing assemblies: two identical upper rollers and a lower, slightly wider,
roller. A picture of a TBA is shown at right. The roller assemblies consist of an internal double row tapered
roller bearing whose cup is shrunk fit inside of an outer roller.
The outer roller is the physical interface with the SARJ bearing
race. The outer roller is made of 440C and is lubricated with
1250-2250 Angstroms of gold applied via an ion deposition
process. The gold plating on the rollers serves as the sole
lubrication scheme for the roller/race interface (the internal
tapered roller bearings have a grease lubricant). At the time of
the SARJ preliminary design it was believed that the
mechanism would be exposed to the atomic oxygen present in
the low Earth orbit environment. The final design included
thermal shrouds around the entire circumference of the
mechanism, but these were not part of the baselined design at
the time the lubrication system was being selected. Due to the
long life requirement (30 years) and the assumed exposure of
the mechanism to atomic oxygen, lubricant selection criteria of
the day [1] led designers to select a metallic film lubricant.
The roller assembly is fitted into the trundle bearing via a
camber pivot axis. This fitting is free to rotate approximately
three degrees to allow for proper alignment of the outer roller Figure 3.
with the bearing race under mechanical and/or thermal
deflections. This rotational axis of the roller assembly leaves the roller susceptible to an
moment caused by thrust loads at the roller/race interface. This effect is discussed in detail
design intent was that the solid film lubricant on the rollers would mitigate these thrust loads.
On Orbit Anomaly Investigation
Approximately eleven weeks after the Starboard SARJ was activated on-orbit the mechanism began
exhibiting anomalous operational data. For the following two months engineers on the ground reviewed
on-orbit telemetry and worked with the ISS operators and ISS crew to determine the most likely cause of
the anomalous signature through a series of on orbit tests. Eventually an inspection of the mechanism
during an EVA found that the bearing race was damaged and covered in debris.
Initial Anomaly Investigation
The SARJ software provides continuous status on most of the system’s performance parameters. These
parameters include, but are not limited to, position, speed, motor current draw, target tracking accuracy,
and hardware temperatures. This telemetry is reviewed continuously to ensure the health and effective
operation of the mechanism. The first indication of anomalous behavior came from unexpected changes
in the Starboard SARJ telemetry. In early September, 2007 the ISS operations team raised a concern that
the difference between the commanded and actual velocity of the SARJ was increasing. The SARJ
controller software uses the difference between commanded and actual velocity to determine how much
current to provide to the mechanism’s drive motor. The change in velocity profile prompted a detailed
review of the SARJ operational data. From this review engineers determined that subtle changes in SARJ
performance could be noted starting on September 1 st. Figure 4 below shows the onset of the anomalous
data signature. There are two pieces of telemetry shown. The first is the joint position and the second is
the commanded velocity of the mechanism. The three plots depict ten minutes periods of time from three
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consecutive orbits. Two observations can be made from these data: (1) the irregular data signature
initially occurred at a specific angular position of the joint, and (2) the magnitude of the irregularity is
increasing with time. The frequency of the data spikes increased with time such that after a few days the
commanded velocity at all SARJ angles was off nominal.
Date
Figure 4. Anomalous Data Signature from the SARJ Controller
This anomalous signature appeared similar to a signature encountered previously on the Port SARJ. The
Port SARJ data signature was caused by a problem with the SARJ controller software. With that in mind
the controller and manager software for the system were reset. The intent was to clear out memory
buffers and re-initialize controller variables that could be accumulating and leading to the anomalous data
signature. The software resets did not lead to any change in the anomalous signature. The SARJ
controller did not appear to be the primary cause of the anomaly.
Efforts to exonerate additional components of the system were attempted by switching logical command
strings. The SARJ controller architecture utilizes two fully redundant command strings. Each string is
composed of a multiplexer/de-multiplexer (MDM) where the SARJ controller software is housed, a RJMC
where the velocity control loop and motor power source is located, and a DLA which interfaces with the
driven gear of the SARJ and houses the drive motor. Changing commanded strings did not have an
appreciable effect on the anomalous data signature. This action demonstrated that the hardware from
each drive string was not solely responsible for the data signature.
After clearing the software, MDMs, RJMCs, and DLAs, the primary focus of the investigation turned to the
controller logic. While specific anomalies in the software had been ruled out it was postulated that the
controller might be over correcting for slight changes in mechanism performance. If this were the case
then controller parameters could be modified to optimize the system performance. A thorough review of
the controller logic did not produce any evidence that the anomalous signature could be a controller
effect.
Five weeks into the anomaly investigation engineers had eliminated a number of likely causes for the
anomaly but still did not understand the root cause. Then a significant change in the drive motor current,
approaching system limits, led engineers to the conclusion that the problem was most likely mechanical in
nature. An increase in joint drag appeared to be the cause of the anomaly.
Joint Drag Changes During the Anomaly Investigation
The drive motor current is directly related to the torque required to overcome internal drag and applied
load in order to rotate the joint. Assuming a benign loading environment the SARJ torque is a direct
measure of the fiction in the joint. The relationship between torque and drive motor current is shown
below in Equation 1 (torque constant and SARJ gear ratios can be assumed to be constants).
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SARJ Torque = Drive Motor Current • (Torque Constant • SARJ Gear Ratio)	 (Eq. 1)
Prior to the anomaly peak motor currents of .25 amperes were nominal. This corresponds to joint drag of
approximately 790 N•m (590 ft•lbf). During the initial investigation the peak currents increased to levels as
high as .60 amperes, or 1,910 N•m (1410 ft•lbf) of joint drag. The system capacity is 1.4 amperes. While
the increase in drag was over 100% of the nominal value, it was still well within system capacity with a
torque margin of 1.33. The drive current readings remained steady for two weeks at the increased level.
The system experienced another drastic increase in drive motor current in the first week of October. The
multiple changes in drive motor current throughout the course of the investigation are shown in Figure 5
below. After the 3rd step change drive motor currents were over 1.2 amperes, or 3810 N•m (2810 ft•lbf) of
joint drag. In a one week period the torque margin for the mechanism had decreased from 1.33 to .17.
There was a risk that with another step change in required current there would be an unrecoverable stall
of the mechanism.
Figure 5. Starboard SARJ Drive Motor Current Changes
During the Course of the Anomaly Investigation
In order to fully characterize the joint drag an on-orbit test was executed. The objectives of the test were
to take the controller software out of the loop and directly measure joint drag for all angular positions of
the joint. The test objectives were accomplished by operating the mechanism in a mode of operations
called “Torque as Stepper (TAS)” which does not utilize the controller loop. In TAS mode the operator
keys in a level of commanded current. The procedure for the test had the operators iteratively step up the
amount of current requested until the mechanism began rotating. This was done in 30 degrees
increments so as to cover all angular positions of the joint. The TAS test confirmed conclusively that the
controller was not contributing to the current spikes and that the high drag condition existed across the
entire circumference of the joint, although some areas were worse than others. During the test drag levels
ranged between 2380 N•m (1760 ft•lbf) and 2860 N•m (2110 ft•lbf).
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The anomaly investigation team was confident that increased joint drag was the source of the data
anomalies, however the source of the drag was unknown. An EVA task was planned on the upcoming
Space Shuttle mission to investigate the nature and source of the suspected mechanical drag.
Extra Vehicular Activity and Mechanism Inspection
The goal of the EVA inspection was to look for a “smoking gun” that could have led to the off nominal data
trends. Specifically, the crew was asked to inspect the thermal covers shrouding the joint (Multi Layer
Insulation, or MLI, covers) and the bolts that serve as the structural attachment between the MLI covers
and the SARJ. This inspection would have revealed any evidence of an micro-meteoroid strike or of some
interference between the MLI covers and the rotating half of the SARJ mechanism. Additionally, the crew
was asked to inspect the launch restraint fittings to determine if there was any interference with the MLI
covers. If time permitted, the crew was also asked to remove a MLI cover to inspect the bearing races
and TBAs.
Nothing off nominal was noted during the external survey. The crew had sufficient time to remove a MLI
cover for additional inspection. Upon removing the cover the astronaut immediately noticed that there
were fine metal shavings across the outboard bearing race surface. Additionally the astronaut noted that
the TBA roller housing was acting as a magnet and collecting metal shavings. Samples of the debris
collecting around the TBA housing were gathered and returned to ground for analysis (results discussed
below). A characteristic picture of the condition of the mechanism can be seen in Figure 6 below. The
outboard race ring, and specifically the outer canted surface, appeared discolored and mottled and there
was debris on much of the surrounding hardware.
Figure 6. Astronaut Inspecting the Starboard SARJ During an Extra Vehicular Activity
The root cause of the damaged bearing race was not immediately known. It was clear however that the
mechanism was mechanically damaged and operating in a significantly degraded condition. There was
concern that continued operation could exacerbate the problem. Also, the vibrations caused by rotating
the joint had become severe enough that accelerated hardware fatigue was a concern. The anomaly
investigation team recommended that operation of the Starboard SARJ be halted immediately until the
root cause of the anomaly was known.
After seeing the damage on the Starboard SARJ engineers requested an inspection of the Port SARJ. It
appeared to be operating as expected based on telemetry review. The inspection would provide a point of
comparison to the Starboard SARJ as well as a baseline image of the mechanism. The Port SARJ
inspection was executed on the following EVA. The astronaut determined that the Port SARJ race rings
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looked pristine. The inspection confirmed that the damage was confined to the Starboard SARJ. Figure 7
below shows a picture of the mechanism taken during the inspection. There is no apparent damage or
debris accumulating around the bearing race surfaces or the TBA.
Figure 7. Astronaut Inspection of the Port SARJ During an Extra Vehicular Activity
Lessons Learned
The source of the anomalous data signature was determined less than eight weeks after its genesis.
During this period of time the mechanism continued to operate and damage to the bearing race
propagated around the entire circumference of the ring. It is possible that if the source of the anomaly had
not been discovered the damage would have progressed further (affecting one of the undamaged bearing
surfaces). In hindsight, the anomaly investigation deserves further scrutiny to assess which diagnostic
approaches were most effective, and whether any improvements could have been be made to the
anomaly investigation process or the health monitoring system.
The best data came from a hands on visual inspection of the suspect mechanism. For many spaceflight
mechanisms this is not feasible, or comes at an extremely high cost. On orbit testing also provided an
effective means of exonerating specific components as well as characterizing the mechanism
performance. A systemic review of all possible contributing factors and appropriate test strategies should
be developed immediately after an anomaly is identified.
Additional instrumentation on the mechanism would have aided in diagnosing the anomaly. Strain gauges
and accelerometers mounted directly to the TBAs would have been extremely useful. There are strain
gauges on the SARJ system but none that measure local deflections at the bearing housings. The SARJ
system is susceptible to high tractive forces (addressed in detail in the proceeding sections) which would
have been picked up on locally mounted strain gauges. There are accelerometers on the ISS truss but
these are not part of the SARJ monitoring and diagnostic system. Ground development testing indicated
that the SARJ system was susceptible to debris generation. Accelerometers would provide an indication
that debris in excess of expectations was present. A failure modes analysis should lead to the most
effective instrumentation and monitoring criteria for a mechanism. Given the susceptibility to debris
generation and sensitivity to tractive forces additional instrumentation would have been appropriate for
the SARJ.
More consideration early on should have been given to halting operation of the mechanism until the
anomalous data signature was better understood. Cessation of nominal operations was not seriously
considered until just prior to the EVA inspection because the changes in operating conditions did not
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represent an immediate threat to successful operation. The system was still effectively tracking the sun
with ample torque margin. Instead of focusing on overall system capabilities it would have been more
useful to focus on relative changes in the operational performance. For example, a change in drive motor
current from .25 amperes to .50 amperes represents a change of only 17% in terms of overall torque
margin. However it also reflects a 100% increase in joint drag. This jump in required current should have
caused significant enough concern to stop operating the mechanism. Changes relative to previous
operational data, or data from the rest of the hardware fleet, are more indicative of hardware issues than
changes relative to overall system capability.
Anomaly Root Cause Investigation
A team was formed immediately after the EVA inspection of the Starboard SARJ revealed significant
damage to the bearing surface. The team was made up of individuals from NASA Johnson Space Center
(JSC), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Glenn Research Center
(GRC), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), The Boeing
Company, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (LMSSC), ATK, and Purdue University. The teams
charge was to determine the root cause of the anomaly, determine a corrective action for the damaged
mechanism, and determine appropriate recurrence controls for the undamaged (Port) SARJ.
The debris samples taken during the EVA inspections were analyzed in detail by Boeing Houston and
NASA JSC and KSC materials and process teams [2]. The analysis yielded several key findings. First, the
debris was primarily composed of the case material. Second, the debris thickness showed that the
damage did not extend into the core material. And third, the morphology of the debris indicated that the
damage was initiated via subsurface spalling. It was not immediately clear to the anomaly investigation
team what conditions would generate sufficient stresses to cause the premature case spalling observed.
The anomaly team created a fault tree to aid in the search for the root cause of the damage and to focus
in the areas that were critical for investigation. The focus areas were software, hardware, and operations.
The fault tree yielded over 350 events that were studied individually. The fault tree events were closed by
providing analysis, testing, simulation, or a combination of these. The closure process for the fault tree
required that events be combined in a worst-case fashion. A review of fault tree events led to the
identification of a set of critical variables for this anomaly. The critical variables were determined to be
roller misalignment, lubrication selection and roller/race ring friction, bearing material properties, and
applied loading. The team evaluated the interdependencies between the critical variables to determine
the most probable root cause of the anomaly.
TBA Roller Misalignment
The TBA roller design causes a pushing action on the roller as the SARJ rotates. This design does not
auto correct for roller misalignments as a castoring, or pulling, design would [3]. Misalignment is inherent
to any design and manufacturing process. The trundle bearings used match drilled assembly procedures
to minimize tolerance build-up and associated roller misalignment. Actual misalignment was not
measured on individual units as part of hardware acceptance. After the anomaly had occurred roller
misalignments were measured at MSFC using a coordinate measuring machine as part of the root cause
investigation [4]. The measurements showed that the trundle bearing misalignments were all within
tolerances (+/- 1 degree). Nevertheless, coupled with high friction, the misalignments were large enough
to generate detrimental thrust loads on the roller bearings.
Lubrication Selection and Roller/Race Ring Friction
Gold lubrication was the design choice to mitigate the frictional loads caused by these misalignments in
both the TBA and DLA rollers. Test data obtained as part of the SARJ Anomaly (discussed in further
detail below) show that a gold film on the trundle bearing rollers could maintain a coefficient of friction of
approximately 0.2 between the TBA rollers and race ring [5]. Nominally, a coefficient of friction of 0.2
ensures that the SARJ system maintains dynamic stability which allows the race ring to react loads
distributed along the full contact patch of the trundle bearing rollers. However, an instability arises when
the ratio of thrust load to normal load rises above a critical value of 0.4. At this level of friction an
overturning moment caused by small misalignments in the roller, and subsequent thrust forces, cause the
trundle bearing roller to tilt about its camber axis. The roller tilt causes a decrease in the roller race
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contact and an associated increase in stress at the contact. Test data determined that friction levels in
excess of .0.4 are expected if no lubricant exists in the bearing contact, provided that sufficient roller
misalignments are present [5].
Bearing Material Pro perties and Susceptibility to Spallation
The anomaly team postulated that increased friction between the roller/race interface could cause a
stress field with the maximum shear stresses at the nitride case/15-5PH core interface. The team also
determined that the solid film gold lubricant was not properly adhered to the rollers [6]. Without the gold
lubricant in place the system becomes susceptible to
increased shear and normal stresses. The high shear
stresses at the case/core interface could lead to
subsurface initiated spalling of the case material.
Multiple tests were performed over several months in
an attempt to reproduce this failure mechanism. Tests
performed at the LMSSC facilities in Sunnyvale on a
Trundle Roller Rig were successful in recreating the
spalling effect observed on-orbit [7]. The test rig
Figure 8. Trundle Test Rig Coupon	 loaded a 440C roller against a nitrided 15-5PH
Showing Fingernail Type Spalling [7] 	 coupon. The roller was then rolled in a reciprocating
motion along the coupon’s surface. Figure 8 above
shows a test coupon from the rig. The inset in the Figure shows an example of a “fingernail” type spall.
Spalls of this type were also noted in on-orbit inspection photos.
Applied Loading
The Trundle Test Rig confirmed that subsurface spalling could be induced in the SARJ bearing materials
given sufficiently high stress conditions. Additional work was required to validate that the TBA roller
kinematics were capable of generating the high stresses required given the expected loading conditions.
A dynamic simulation was developed to perform analysis of the SARJ trundle bearings. The purpose of
this simulation was to quantify the loads between each of the trundle bearing rollers and the race ring.
The simulation included the race ring deformation caused by the thermal environment, the stiffness of the
trundle bearing itself and the stiffness of the inboard and outboard trusses of the ISS. It also included the
structural flexibility of the ISS trusses. The simulations were used to perform parametric studies in support
of the closure of the SARJ Fault Tree events. The simulation used traction data obtained from NASA
GRC testing for the contact between the race ring and the TBA rollers both with and without gold coating.
The simulation was used to estimate the loads at the roller to race ring interface and to illustrate the
kinematic behavior of the TBA rollers. The development and results of this simulation are discussed
below
Analysis of Roller Ed ge Loading
The effect of small angular misalignments on rolling traction forces has been studied by a number of
investigators, as summarized by K.L. Johnson in [8]. Solutions to the governing equations of rolling have
been developed in closed form for a few geometries, and powerful numerical methods have been
developed to address the problem for more general application. These methods are important for the
present investigation because the angular misalignment of the trundle bearing rollers can lead to dramatic
changes in the loads and stresses on the race ring surfaces.
The mistrack or “toe” angle of a TBA roller is the misalignment of the roller due to rotation about an axis
normal to the race ring surface. The existence of some small mistracking angle is inherent in the
hardware build process. The metrology laboratory at MSFC performed detailed measurements of the
mistrack angle of the Starboard SARJ TBA rollers after they had been returned from orbit. Mistracking
between the roller and race creates a friction force on the roller in the thrust direction, denoted Q in Figure
9 below. This yields a moment about the camber axis, which is reacted by the normal load between the
roller and race. As the magnitude of the thrust friction increases, the load distribution on the roller
becomes unevenly distributed to react the induced moment. The distance d in Figure 9 denotes the
lateral distance from the camber axis to the center of normal pressure of the contact. In stable tilting, the
distance d increases with increasing camber tilt, offsetting the camber moment generated by an
increasing thrust friction Q. However, after a certain camber angle threshold is reached, d begins to
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decrease with increasing camber angle, causing the roller to enter into unstable tilting. The analysis and
inspection of the Starboard SARJ TBAs shows that the outer canted rollers remained in the regime of
stable tilting during the time when the race ring was being damaged.
Figure 9. Trundle Bearing Roller Stability
In order to investigate the effect of roller mistracking on the contact forces, a numerical boundary element
analysis tool was developed by researchers at Purdue University and Boeing. This tool was rigorously
validated against closed form solutions and also shows excellent agreement with the traction results
obtained through testing at Glenn Research Center (GRC) [5]. GRC was able to quantify the friction-
mistracking relationship in a Vacuum Roller Rig (VRR). The VRR replicates the flight-like rolling interface
and materials in a vacuum environment. A comparison between traction curves developed by test at GRC
and via analysis is shown below in Figure 10. One will note that the analytical results closely match the
test data. It is also worth nothing that the VRR rollers do not have identical degrees of freedom to the TBA
rollers and therefore the TBA rollers must be addressed by a modified thrust curve (discussed below, see
Figure 13).
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Figure 10. Comparison of Thrust Curves from Analytical Results and VRR Test Data [5]
Figure 11 below shows the transverse shear traction distribution on the GRC test rollers for a
representative misalignment case. The plot on the left shows that the contact area is divided into regions
of stick and slip. The stick region, shown in green, is located at the leading edge of the contact. As the
unstressed material of the test rollers enters into the contact patch, the shear deflections and tractions
between the two rollers build until the shear tractions reach the limiting value of friction defined by the
coefficient of sliding friction, µ, times the normal pressure. As material moves through the trailing end of
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the contact, slipping occurs between contacting points on the rollers, and the shear tractions remain at
the limiting value of friction.
Figure 11. Shear Traction Distribution for GRC Test Rollers, Q/P = 0.4
For increasing mistrack angles, the stick region gradually decreases in size until the total thrust load
equals µ times the normal load, at which point the entire contact region is in slip. For small mistrack
angles such as those observed on the Starboard SARJ TBAs, the rollers remain in partial sliding, and the
total frictional force is less than the limiting value of sliding friction.
The tractive phenomena in the flight TBA rollers are analogous to those in the GRC test rollers, with the
exception that the TBA rollers have an additional camber degree of freedom. The flight TBA rollers also
have a flat profile that transitions to a 0.060 inch blend radius at the edges of the contact. As a result, the
size and shape of the contact patch for a TBA roller vary dramatically depending on the thrust loading and
camber angle of the roller. The contact patch dimensions are plotted in the left portion of Figure 12 below
for increasing values of thrust load. This plot shows that as the TBA roller tilts on edge due to the thrust
loads, the area in contact with the race ring is reduced. The right portion of Figure 12 shows that the
average normal contact pressure increases dramatically as a result of the reduced contact area.
Average Contact Pressure for
Varying Thrust Load
0.05	 0.1	 0.15	 0.2	 0.25	 0.3	 0.35	 0.4	 0.45
Thrust / Normal Load
Figure 12. Contact Patch Dimensions and Average Contact Pressure for TBA Roller
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In the study of rolling contact mechanics, the relationship between the transverse rolling creep (related to
the mistrack angle) and the traction ratio Q/P is known as the traction curve. The analysis of the SARJ
TBA rollers found that the shape of the contact patch caused by cambering has an influence on the
traction curve for the roller. This effect is such that as a TBA roller begins to tip about its camber axis, the
frictional loads are less severe than they would otherwise be, thereby mitigating the tipping phenomenon.
The blue dotted line in Figure 13 below shows the traction curve for the flight TBA roller if the camber axis
were fixed at 0°. The red dotted line shows the traction curve if the camber axis were fixed at 2°. In the
actual TBA, where the camber axis is free to rotate, the traction curve follows the 0° fixed camber curve
for small mistrack angles. However, for larger mistrack angles the changing geometry of the contact patch
causes the thrust friction loads to be less severe than in the fixed camber case, as shown by the solid
black line in the Figure. Despite this phenomenon, thrust loads as high as 0.4 times the normal load can
be generated with mistrack angles less than 0.5°.
LMi-----n^g A, r g q(d g)j
Figure 13. Traction Curves for Outer Canted TBA Roller
Detailed measurements and tolerance analysis of the Starboard SARJ TBAs identified an approximate
worst case mistrack angle of 0.36°. The normal and shear pressure distributions at the contact are shown
in Figure 14 below for that mistrack case. As a result of camber tilting, only about one quarter of the width
of the roller is in contact with the race ring surface. The resulting stresses at the interface between the
race ring case material and the parent material were found to exceed the yield strength of the parent
material.
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	 Shear Pressure
Max Normal Pressure: 532 ksi 	 Max Shear Traction 283 ksi
Total Normal Load: 823 lb
	
Total Friction Load: 316 lb
Figure 14. Distribution of Normal and Shear Pressure for 0.36°
Mistracking, TBA Outer Canted Roller
In addition to concentrating the contact pressures at the roller edges, frictional thrust loads due to
mistracking also have the effect of increasing or decreasing the normal loads on adjacent rollers.
Depending on the specific combination of roller mistrack angles and the direction of SARJ rotation, it is
possible for the race ring’s triangular cross-section to be wedged in between two of the TBA rollers. This
wedging action is analogous to a positive feedback loop. Frictional loads on the Datum A and outer
canted rollers lead to increased normal loads on those rollers, which in turn allow the contacts to generate
higher frictional loads. Photographs of the damaged race ring surface taken by the on-orbit crew support
the hypothesis that the initiation of damage occurred under these wedging conditions.
Contact Stress for Flat and Crowned TBA Rollers
The root cause team further found that the bearing edge stresses were exacerbated by the flat, un-
crowned profile of the TBA rollers. The roller geometry made the system sensitive to non-Hertzian effects,
which gave rise to high pressure points at the edges of the rollers during the initial run-in period of the
mechanism. These high pressure points are visible in the contact stress profile of the TBA rollers shown
in the left side of Figure 15 below. Part of the recurrence control plan for the SARJ is to modify the rollers
on any spare TBAs to include logarithmically crowned rollers. The logarithmic roller profile is a shape that
has been mathematically optimized to eliminate the high pressure points that ordinarily occur at the edges
of cylindrical roller bearings.
Flat Roller Profile 	 Logarithmic Roller Profile
Figure 15. Normal Contact Stress Distribution for TBA Roller, P = 980 lb
13
Root Cause Investigation Conclusions
On-orbit video photographic, visual evidence, and debris samples analyses indicate that the SARJ race
ring nitrided layer spalled from the base 15-5 PH steel. The spalling occurred over a period of two and
one half months after the Starboard SARJ on-orbit activation. The first signs that the spalling was taking
place were manifested through telemetry data that indicated the average operating current of the SARJ
was rising from nominal values of 0.15 amps to as high as 0.8 amps.
During this time the Structural Dynamic Measurement Data System of the ISS was indicating vibrations
that were anomalous. These vibrations were later confirmed to be linked to the degrading condition of the
SARJ race ring surface. As the race ring surface became progressively rougher over time as a result of
the spalling, the vibrations the ISS was sustaining while the Starboard SARJ was rotating were a concern
to the structural life of the Space Station. These vibrations were inducing load cycles on ISS hardware
that were high enough to be counted in the nominal ISS loads spectrum for structural fatigue.
Testing and analysis indicate that the SARJ race ring surface damage was caused by tractive forces
(normal and shear) applied to the race ring surface by the TBA and DLA rollers. Severe loading cases are
observed with mistracking angles smaller than the as-measured TBA mistracking angles. Mistracking
loads are sensitive to roller edge loading, multiple roller mistracking, direction of mistracking and race ring
rotation direction. Analysis indicates that worst loads occur on the gear side of outer canted surface and
Datum A surface.
Testing shows that gold, as a solid lubricant, is capable of maintaining a low coefficient of friction (0.2) for
mistracking angles higher than the maximum conservatively predicted angle for the TBAs [4,5]. Testing
reproduced several visible features of the on-orbit damage [7]. Testing also shows loss of gold adhesion
[6]. Using the same roller material as the SARJ TBA, the ion-sputtering process used for the starboard
SARJ rollers was re-created and the gold finish was tested. The tests exonerated the gold plating
process. However, aging humidity tests indicated that, in time, the gold film would delaminate from the
parent material due to corrosive growth on the substrate.
Metallographic analysis was performed to compare the imperfections between the race rings used for the
starboard SARJ and the port SARJ. The data indicate that the defect concentrations in the starboard ring
nitrided case are approximately six times that of the port nitrided case. The difference in the nitride case
defect concentrations makes the starboard SARJ race ring more susceptible to damage initiation and
damage propagation caused by high loading. It also may explain the survivability performance of the port
SARJ race rings [10].
Anomaly Most Probably Root Cause
The kinematics of the TBA and DLA mechanisms require that the roller thrust loads (related to friction
coefficient and mistracking angle) be controlled to ensure stable roller line contact with the race ring
surfaces. Inadequate lubrication of the roller/race ring interface combined with roller mistracking angles
within specification resulted in thrust loads high enough to cause at least some of the TBA or DLA rollers
to edge load as the SARJ rotated. When a roller is edge loaded, the preload on that roller is concentrated
on a reduced contact area resulting in high contact stresses and shear stresses in the race ring case and
core. These stresses exceed the allowable bearing strength capability of the race ring case and core
leading to brittle fracture and spalling of the nitrided layer from the starboard SARJ race ring.
Lessons Learned
As part of the root cause investigation, the build-paper was reviewed. Unlike the Port SARJ which was
tested in vacuum the Starboard SARJ was not, due to cost considerations. A complex mechanism such
as the SARJ cannot be analyzed for break-in performance. Instrumented vacuum testing, particularly for
the break-in period, might have yielded indications that the as-built mechanism was not operating
nominally. Since the degradation of the Starboard SARJ took place over a short period, during
accelerated testing, the current increase would have been evident in a very short period of time.
The build-paper investigation also indicates that the testing decisions made for the Starboard SARJ did
not accurately account for the friction differences between an ambient and vacuum test environment. The
root cause investigation highlighted the sensitivity of the SARJ to small changes in friction. The SARJ
Structural Test Article was tested at ambient to verify drive pinion life. The test was not intended to verify
system life. However, since the entire system was utilized during the test, successful completion of the
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test gave a false sense of security regarding system level life. Recent testing indicates that the vacuum
coefficient of friction between 15-5 PH nitrided steel and 440C steel roller is approximately 0.6 [5]. It is
now understood that operating the SARJ with coefficients of friction greater than 0.3 increases the risk of
roller tilting and resulting damage to the race ring surface.
The root cause investigation also highlighted the importance of correlating testing with analysis and
dynamic simulations. Cost-effective and cost-saving simulations can aid the mechanism designer in the
understanding of the mechanism performance prior to its fielding. Moreover, mechanism testing should
have as a stated objective the correlation of the critical variables of the mechanisms performance. This
process can increase the chances of finding phenomena that may be time consuming to test without prior
knowledge. The lesson learned here is two-fold and inextricable. A complex mechanism should not be
flown into space without testing, nor should it be flown only having been tested. Analysis must be integral
to the testing but should not be used in lieu of testing. There are many conditions for mechanism failure
that could be understood in a reasonable and cost-effective basis only by analysis.
The damage sustained by the starboard SARJ highlights the importance of sound design and verification
practices in the development of complex rotating space machinery. The non-Hertzian contact mechanics
of the roller bearing to race ring interface proved to be a crucial detail of the system. Special attention
should be given to such effects in the design of bearing systems. The SARJ exhibited high vulnerability to
damage during the initial run-in phase of the mechanism’s life. The risks incurred during this period can
be mitigated through the use of adequate lubrication, crowned rollers, detailed screening of the nitriding
process, the implementation of a pre-flight run-in period, and a through understanding of the differences
between ambient and vacuum performance. The addition of these elements to the design, verification and
operational plans for the SARJ forms the basis for the continued successful use of the mechanism in
flight.
On-Orbit Implementation of a Corrective Action
Operations of the Starboard SARJ were severely restricted as soon as the damage was observed. The
reduction in operation protected the ISS structure against the vibrations caused by SARJ rotations and
against a stall of the mechanism. If the SARJ were to experience an unrecoverable stall, the operational
impacts to the ISS would be significant enough to affect future missions and utilization of the station.
These potential operational impacts to the ISS warranted corrective action.
The SARJ recovery team concluded that it was a reasonable action to remove debris, to the extent
possible, from the damaged race ring and to add grease lubricant to all three bearing surfaces of the race
ring. Debris removal was intended to decrease drive motor currents and improve torque margin. The
intent of the lubricant was to improve the lubricity between the roller/race interface in order to maintain a
coefficient of friction below the critical roller tipping value; the improved lubricity, in turn, would protect the
remaining undamage surface from experiencing degradation. Braycote 602EF was chosen because the
base oil has the lowest vapor pressure of all available space greases. It also has molybdenum disulfide
which is an excellent lubricant for sliding and capable of handling high loads.
Procedure Development
A preliminary cleaning and lubrication method was developed with inputs from the EVA tools and crew
training teams. This method was successfully executed on a small section of race ring during an on-orbit
test on the ISS 1J mission. Armed with the lessons learned from the cleaning trials, the team decided to
clean and lubricate the entire damaged race ring during the STS-126/ULF2 mission. The team also
decided to remove and replace all of the TBAs during ULF2. A significant amount of debris had
accumulated on the TBAs, so their replacement would result in additional removal of debris from the joint.
This also allowed for the return the original TBAs for inspection to assist in the root cause investigation.
The cleaning and lubrication trials showed that the best method to clean the SARJ was to wet the surface
with an EVA wipe pre lubricated with Braycote 602EF©
 and then scrape the surface with a scraper tool.
Lubricating the surface prior to scraping proved to be the best method to contain the loose debris
particles and prevent them from being liberated and dispersed throughout the rest of the mechanism
while scraping. The final application of lubricant to the surfaces after cleaning was done using a grease
gun. The inner race ring surface is not visible to the crew so a unique lubrication tool, called the J-Hook
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nozzle, was developed by the JSC EVA tool team to allow the crew to lubricate that surface. Photos of
the tools used are shown in Figure 16 below.
Figure 16. Tools used in SARJ Clean and Lube Operations
While the cleaning methods were developed based upon the on orbit trials, the method to lubricate the
cleaned race ring was developed on the ground. A 60 degree section of race ring was used to determine
the pattern and quantity of grease to be applied. Based on testing and crew input, it was decided that the
best way to apply lubrication to the race ring was to place a single bead of grease down the middle of the
roller track. The outer 45 and datum –A- surfaces were lubricated in this manner. The inner 45 race
surface was lubricated using the J-Hook nozzle. The J-Hook was designed so the grease would be
smeared along the width of the race ring surface and would encompass the roller track of the TBA and
DLA rollers. The final grease configuration required residual grease dams on either side of the roller track
after the TBA roller had passed over and spread the grease. These repositories of grease on the sides of
the track serve as a source of oil that will constantly re-wet the roller track and provide lubrication during
subsequent SARJ operations.
Lab tests were also run where grease was added to a race ring surface contaminated with metallic
particles similar to the debris retrieved from the SARJ on orbit. These tests showed that the hydrodynamic
force generated by the roller passing over the grease was enough to push a majority of the debris out of
the roller track. As a result, the addition of lubricant to the damaged race ring serves a dual purpose as a
cleaning fluid for any debris left on the SARJ after the cleaning operation. The clean and lubrication
operations were successfully completed during ULF2. Figure 17 below shows the final application method
and grease configuration.
Figure 17. Final Grease Application Methods
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Figure 18. Starboard SARJ Motor Drive Current Comparison Pre and Post Clean & Lubrication
Results of Corrective Action
Following the successful cleaning and lubrication of the starboard SARJ, the joint was rotated and the
motor drive current was monitored. The motor current decreased immediately from a pre-cleaning and
lubrication average of 0.242 amperes to 0.174 amperes. The more critical benefit was the significant
reduction in the maximum current levels. The large swing in motor drive current observed prior to the
clean and lube operations was mitigated significantly, resulting in a reduction in the maximum current
from 0.870 amperes to 0.384 amperes. These results demonstrate that the clean and lube operations
were successful in increasing the stall margin in the SARJ which, in turn, maintains operational flexibility
of the ISS. These post lube data also compare well with the performance of the starboard SARJ telemetry
prior to the anomaly when the SARJ had an average motor current of 0.153 amperes and a maximum of
0.221 amperes. Data plots showing the motor current prior to the clean and lube operations (data taken
during the 10A mission), during ULF2 just after the clean and lube operations, and data taken during
ULF2 stage operations is shown in Figure 18 below.
The port SARJ was also lubricated with Braycote 602EF © during Flight ULF2 using the same procedures
and tools as were developed for the starboard SARJ. The lubricant was intended to protect the
mechanism against damage by the same mechanism as was experienced by the starboard SARJ. Pre
and post lubrication data for the port SARJ shows a 20% decrease in average drive motor current, shown
in Figure 19 below. This drop is significant as it indicates that the mechanism pre lubrication was
operating in a regime of higher roller/race friction than post lubrication and was therefore more
susceptible to damage initiation prior to the application of the grease lubricant.
Post-Lubrication Average: 0.122
Pre-Lubrication Average: 0.148
4
Pre-Lubrication
October 2008
	
November 2008
	
December 2008
Figure 19. Port SARJ Average Motor Drive Current Comparison Pre and Post Clean & Lubrication
As noted earlier, anomalous structural vibrations were one of the first hints of a problem with the SARJ.
The surface of the race ring had degraded significantly and it was not anticipated that the clean and
lubrication tasks would have a significant impact on the vibrations observed on ISS. The accelerometer
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data after ULF2 showed that the peak accelerations had been reduced significantly. Data plots showing
pre and post ULF2 accelerometer data are displayed in Figure 20 below and show the dramatic decrease
in vibrations to the ISS due to SARJ rotation.
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Figure 20. ISS Acceleration Data Pre and Post ULF2 [9]
Lessons Learned
The dramatically improved performance of the SARJ mechanism due to the cleaning and addition of
grease to a damaged and contaminated race ring is an important finding for space systems mechanism
design. Most directly, these observations can be applied to the design of mechanisms that will, by nature
of their intended use, be exposed to high levels of contamination (e.g. mechanisms on lunar or Martian
based systems). It is recommended that designers consider adding the capability of re-lubrication and/or
cleaning of bearing systems, especially those which be exposed to high debris filled environments.
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Conclusions
Anomalous performance of the Starboard SARJ was noted shortly after the mechanism was activated on-
orbit. An inspection found that there was debris covering the bearing race of the rotating mechanism. An
anomaly team was immediately formed to investigate the issue. Through a series of tests, analysis, and
simulations the team determined that the most likely cause of the damage was high friction at the
bearing/race ring contact coupled with a susceptibility of the bearing mechanism to an overturning
moment on the bearing rollers. Dynamic analysis simulating the contact conditions of the SARJ
mechanism, both lubricated and un-lubricated, confirmed that in the un-lubricated condition sufficient
stresses occur to damage the race ring. Grease lubricant was applied to the mechanism in order to
mitigate the existing damage as well as prevent further damage. Additionally, astronauts removed the
debris noted during previous inspections. These actions proved effective as overall joint drag significantly
decreased as did structural vibrations caused by operating the mechanism.
The SARJ anomaly investigation and recovery provides several lessons learned both in the arena of
diagnosing on-orbit anomalies and in complex aerospace mechanism design and verification. Mechanism
design should incorporate proven and verifiable features whenever possible. Features that do not lend
themselves readily to analysis cannot easily undergo the rigorous verification process that aerospace
mechanisms demand; for example the TBA roller profile gives rise to non-Hertzian contact effects which
requires advanced analytical methodology in order to recover the stresses. The acceptance program for
complex mechanisms should include a run in period during which the mechanism is operated in the flight
environment. This run in period should be used to correlate analytical models of the mechanism as well
as provide a baseline of expected performance for the mechanism while on-orbit. Test correlated and
verified models can be used to determine system level sensitivities and potential design problems.
Additionally, understanding the sensitivities of the system will allow for the most effective use of
instrumentation and monitoring techniques of the mechanism while on-orbit. A baseline performance
characterization provides ground operators an effective means for gauging the severity of changes in
performance after activation. Finally, mechanisms that operate in an environment susceptible to debris
contamination should consider inclusion of re-lubrication and cleaning capabilities. These lessons should
be utilized by architects of future aerospace mechanisms to yield more robust systems.
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